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Carlos Massad* and 
Roberto Zahler** 
Closely linked to the external financing difficulties of 
Latin America is the problem of domestic financing 
and debt, a problem less studied and understood but 
no less important. In many countries of the region 
this problem has helped to delay economic recovery 
and discourage the accumulation of capital, and 
sometimes the steps taken to solve it can work 
against the programmes and policies designed to 
cope with the problem of the region's foreign debt. 
The increased supply of international liquidity 
and inappropriate domestic policies encouraged 
domestic over-indebtedness which, by virtue of its 
extent, duration, concentration and risk, distorted 
and impeded economic growth and the efficient allo-
cation of resources and undermined the stability and 
solvency of domestic financial systems. 
This has been the experience, to greater or 
lesser extent, of the countries of Latin America in 
recent years; although the process can be seen as a 
simple transfer of wealth, in practice it usually 
involves numerous economic costs for society. In a 
search for some way of preventing a recurrence of 
the problems of domestic over-indebtedness, the 
authors of this article have drawn lessons for the 
formulation of macroeconomic financial policies. 
Prudence in the management of certain key prices, 
co-ordination of economic reforms, caution in inte-
gration in international markets, and establishment 
of a system of financial institutions adapted to the 
goals and designed to trigger alarm signals are some 
examples of the action lines indicated by the region's 
experience. 
•Doctor of Economics (cand.), University of Chicago. 
Co-ordinator UNDP/ECLAC Financial Projects, and Profes-
sor at the University of Santiago, Chile. Former President 
of the Central Bank of Chile. 
**Doctor of Economics (cand), University of Chicago. 
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I 
Is domestic debt a problem? 
The external financing crisis which has been 
affecting the region since the beginning of the 
1980s has become the central focus of attention 
of international bodies, analysts, and national 
economic authorities. Closely linked to the exter-
nal financing difficulties of Latin America is 
another less studied and understood yet critical 
factor —domestic financing. In several countries 
this problem has helped to delay economic rec-
overy and discourage the accumulation of capital, 
and sometimes the steps taken to solve it have 
worked against the programmes and policies 
designed to cope with the region's foreign debt. 
As is the case with foreign debt in normal 
periods, the countries usually operate with cer-
tain levels of domestic debt. The various initial 
stocks of resources and capacities of economic 
agents, the age-distribution of the population, 
the structure of its priorities, and the potential to 
generate investment projects are just some of 
the factors which ensure that lending and bor-
rowing units interact, basically through interme-
diary institutions (mainly the financial system), 
in domestic borrowing and lending. As in the 
case of the foreign debt, if the domestic debt is to 
serve the process of economic development, 
there must be a degree of correspondence 
between the amounts, periods and rates of 
growth of the debt, on the one hand, and the 
dynamism of the economy (and of exports, in the 
case of the foreign debt) on the other, and indeed 
between the interest rates charged on loans and 
the productivity of capital. When this correspon-
dence is lacking and the imbalances last for sig-
nificant periods, what is a usual and useful 
process for economic development in normal 
situations can become a serious impediment. 
In the study of domestic debt it is customary 
to distinguish between public and private debt. 
Public Domestic debt has been analysed exten-
sively in the literature, because it forms part of 
fiscal policy and because it is assumed that from 
the economic standpoint the government can 
and usually does behave differently from the 
private sector. The study of domestic debt has 
covered topics such as the transfer of welfare 
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from the present to the future (i.e., the intergen-
erational distribution of welfare), the effect of 
the public debt on the private sector's rate of 
capital accumulation, the displacement or sup-
plementing of private expenditure by public 
expenditure, the effect of the public sector debt 
on the interest rate and ultimately on the net 
risk, and the reaction of the private sector. These 
phenomena depend on expectations about the 
mechanisms which will be used by the govern-
ment to service its debt and on the expected 
evolution of the debt over time. 
Private domestic debt, in contrast, has 
received much less attention in the literature, 
especially from a macroeconomic perspective, 
because it has usually been assumed that the net 
effect of the economic behaviour of lenders and 
borrowers tends to be nil (since each debt has an 
equivalent loan). This means believing that the 
market mechanisms which transfer rights of 
ownership from some owners to others in the 
private sector are merely making transfers of 
assets, without there being any net losses of 
capital resulting from possible negative effects 
of the domestic debt on the allocation of resour-
ces, the volume of investment or other factors. 
However, what has happened in recent years 
suggests that in a large number of countries the 
domestic debt of the private sector has symp-
toms and characteristics which make it a major 
obstacle to economic reactivation and mastery of 
the crisis which has been affecting the region 
since the beginning of the 1980s. Table 1 shows 
that the domestic debt of Argentina, Chile, Ecua-
dor and Mexico grew very quickly between the 
mid-1970s and the early 1980s. Similar results 
were observed in Uruguay and Venezuela as 
well. In the cases of Colombia and Peru, although 
there was some increase in the ratio of private 
debt to product, it was not very large. However, 
in Brazil this ratio declined, owing partly to a 
crowding-out effect of pressure from the public 
sector on the monetary systems. 
Owing to the magnitude, duration and scope 
(in different areas of economic activity) of the 
domestic debt in the majority of the countries of 
the region, the time needed for and the cost of 
transferring assets between lenders and borrow-
ers have been greater than usually assumed in 
theory. Moreover, the diversity of the agents 
involved (borrowers, financial intermediaries, 
depositors, foreign banks, governments) and the 
widespread nature of the situation have made 
the legal procedures for redefining and reallocat-
ing rights of ownership more lengthy and 
difficult. 
All this has meant greater arrears on the 
part of the debtor banks and larger matured and 
Table 1 
PRIVATE DOMESTIC DEBT, 1975-1985" 




















































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1986 and several monthly issues up to 
June 1987. 
"Monetary system loans to the private sector as at the end of the first quarter of each year. 
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high-risk portfolios in the national financial sys-
tem, whose liquidity and even solvency have 
been severely affected. The reduced supply of 
resources for lending for profitable and dynamic 
activities and the increased cost of credit have 
aggravated even further the position of the bor-
rowers in the banking system and reduced their 
capacity to service their domestic debt. This has 
undermined the expansion of productive capac-
ity and complicated and obstructed even further 
the possible ways of solving the problem. 
The magnitude and widespread nature of 
private domestic debt and its close links with the 
national financial systems, together with the 
recession in recent years and the high domestic 
interest rates, demanded a massive transfer of 
ownership as a means of solving the problem. 
This transfer was impossible owing to the great 
political and economic costs which it would have 
involved. This helped to weaken the national 
financial systems, paralyze investment and the 
At the beginning of the 1980s the domestic debt 
of most of the countries had grown to such an 
extent that if the assets representing the current 
value of the income expected from the (con-
sumption or investment) projects financed by 
the debt had had to be sold to pay it off, the 
amount obtained would not have been sufficient 
to cover the payment and the creditors would 
have been faced with an uncovered capital loss. 
This high level of domestic debt originated in 
the very high level of expenditure in Latin 
America in the boom period of the second half of 
the 1970s. The external and internal conditions 
underlying that boom were transitory, so that 
when they disappeared the precariousness of the 
national economies stood revealed: excessive 
levels of internal and external debt and inability 
of national financial and productive systems to 
recover and expand. 
One of the factors which most encouraged 
this unbridled expenditure in the region was the 
abundant influx of foreign capital between 1974 
supply of bank credit and encourage the flight of 
capital. These very tangible phenomena have 
imposed a major restriction on the recovery and 
future expansion of the production apparatus. 
No less tangible and important have been the 
adverse redistributive effects of the allocation of 
public resources to the maintenance of certain 
economic activities, including of course those of 
the financial sector, in the search for a "solution" 
to its debt problems. 
All of this justifies the attempt made in the 
following pages to understand the common fea-
tures of the present process of domestic borrow-
ing in the region and its consequences. After a 
brief analysis of the origins and the recent devel-
opment of the domestic debt, its main effects 
will be described and the implications of possible 
alternative solutions to this problem will be 
explored, with, lastly, an indication of the main 
lessons of the recent experience of excessive 
domestic debt in Latin America. 
and 1981. The changes in the world monetary 
system and the increasing privatization of inter-
national liquidity, the macroeconomic policies of 
the industrial countries and the impact of the 
sharp increase in hydrocarbons prices, in con-
junction initially with the low concentration of 
loans from private international banks in Latin 
America, explain the great influx of external 
credit into the region, initially at low cost. This 
increased supply of international liquidity 
greatly expanded the possibilities of direct bor-
rowing from abroad —mainly for governments, 
public enterprises and banks— and increased the 
capacity of national financial systems to make 
domestic loans. 
Domestic policies also stimulated the 
demand for internal and external financing. The 
greater the speed of the financial reforms, which 
almost all the countries of the region carried out 
to some extent, the more they encouraged 
domestic borrowing by national economic 
agents. The domestic financial liberalization, 
II 
Main causes of domestic over-indebtedness 
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also called financial deregulation, was a process 
designed to eliminate or reduce some of the 
restrictions on the region's financial systems. 
Prominent among them were interest rate con-
trols, the amount and composition of the assets 
and liabilities portfolios of the financial system, 
and the rules governing the type and nature of 
the financial instruments which financial inter-
mediaries were authorized to issue and place on 
the market. All these restrictions had impeded 
the proliferation of informal financial markets. 
The links between domestic borrowing and 
domestic financial liberalization were very close. 
The rapid decontrol of interest rates caused, 
amidst anti-inflationary policies, high real lend-
ing and borrowing rates,1 although positive real 
rates did not occur in all cases (table 2). The real 
rates attained were much higher than historical 
interest rates. 
National-currency deposits in the national 
financial systems grew very strongly in real 
terms and also as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product,2 enabling these systems to 
increase their lending capacity, with a conse-
quent increase in financial assets. 
Moreover, the financial deregulation in 
economies unaccustomed to operating competi-
tively in this sector encouraged financial inter-
mediaries to be over-bold in their efforts to 
increase their lending. Accustomed to operating 
in the pre-reforms market, the banks based their 
risk and solvency analyses on the past perfor-
mance of their clients* and on their real guaran-
tees,4 rather than on a technical evaluation of the 
quality of the projects and the net earnings 
expected from them. This encouraged the 
imprudent expansion of bank investments. Very 
optimistic expectations about the economic 
future, confidence in the stability of macroeco-
nomic policies and the prevailing "up-beat" eco-
nomic atmosphere helped to distort the 
perception of the real possibilities of economic 
•The borrowing rates expressed in dollars had values much 
higher than the international rates. 
2Taking the place to some extent of other forms of wealth 
retention, so that their net impact on domestic saving was gener-
ally much lower than on financial saving. 
sWhich can be and usually is radically altered by tariff, price, 
tax and other reforms. 
«Which can be exaggerated by speculation in certain assets 
markets or by policies which encourage overvaluation of the 
currency. 
growth. This euphoric atmosphere was often 
encouraged by the national economic authorities 
themselves and even by international financial 
bodies. This generated widespread over-
borrowing on the part of domestic agents and 
business sectors and an over-expansion of lend-
ing even by more professional financial 
institutions. 
A last factor of fundamental importance in 
the financial liberalization was the lack of ade-
quate supervision and control of the financial 
sector, in conjunction with an institutional sys-
tem conceived for a much more regulated and 
interventionist context. This facilitated, more by 
omission than commission, excessive financial 
laxity, which was closely associated with the 
domestic over-indebtedness. 
The financial deregulation briefly described 
above played an especially important role in 
Table 2 
REAL INTEREST RATES, 
1975-1985" 
(Annual percentages) 
Argentina Chile Uruguay 
Lend- Bor- Lend- Bor- Lend- Bor-



























































Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone 
of Latin America, 1973-1983, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Chile: Roberto Zahler, "Las tasas de interés en 
Chile, 1975-1982", in El desarrollo financiero de 
América Latina y el Caribe, Instituto 
Interamericano de Mercados de Capital, Caracas, 
1985. 
"Nominal interest rates deflated by the consumer price 
index. 
The second half extrapolated for the whole year, after the 
financial liberalization had begun. 
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Table 3 
EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1975-1986° 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund. 
"The average of the indices of the real exchange rate of the currency of each country against the currencies of the main 
countries from which it imports, weighted according to the imports structure. 
Preliminary figures. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and, more 
recently, in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. The 
external financial openness, which was particu-
larly developed in the countries of the Southern 
Cone, expanded even further the capacity of 
national financial systems to increase their 
investments; domestic borrowing was encour-
aged by strong expectations of interest rate cuts, 
in the hope of a swift and considerable fall in the 
cost of borrowing. Furthermore, the greater 
facilities and incentives for borrowing abroad,5 
offered to financial intermediaries in particular, 
encouraged the acquisition of external financial 
resources for subsequent intermediation in local 
markets. 
Thus the financial deregulation made a deci-
sive contribution to the encouragement of the 
domestic demand for financing (which by the 
very nature of the market in loan funds in coun-
tries such as those of Latin America tends to 
exert pressure on bank lending) and the 
increased supply of funds for domestic lending 
'By means of sharp differentials between the domestic inter-
est rates, adjusted in expectation of devaluation, and the interna-
tional rates, a situation caused to a large extent by the financial 
deregulation itself. 
by the financial system, which grew very 
strongly. 
In many of the countries of the region 
macroeconomic policies, and in particular those 
designed to check and reverse inflationary pro-
cesses, also helped to encourage expenditure and 
domestic borrowing, especially in the frame-
work of the financial reforms described above. 
The influence of the so-called monetarist 
approach of the balance of payments was felt 
strongly in Latin America in the second half of 
the 1970s, not only through the policies on 
financial openness and foreign currency reserves 
but also through the stabilization programmes. 
In the light of the theory of parity of purchasing 
power and in anticipation of the increasing 
importance of internationally tradeable goods in 
the national economies, it was thought that 
exchange rate policy could play a fundamental 
role in containing inflation. There was wides-
pread acceptance of the idea that an increase in 
domestic prices was closely linked to the future 
movement of the nominal exchange rate 
through the direct impact of the exchange rate 
on both production and financial costs (by its 
effect on tradeable goods and inputs and on the 
indexed prices and costs characteristic of the 
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economies in the region with high inflation) and 
on expectations of inflation. Because it was 
thought that the current and programmed 
movement of the exchange rate would have a 
strong influence on the anticipated exchange 
rate, there was a tendency in practice to devalue 
at a slower rate than was consistent with move-
ments in prices and other key economic varia-
bles.6 This retardation of the exchange rate was 
particularly serious in the cases of Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela, even 
though it was quite apparent in Mexico and Peru 
at different periods (table 3). 
The tendency to overvalue the exchange 
rate, in conjunction with an external financial 
openness usually implemented without due care 
or adequate supervision encouraged excessive 
domestic borrowing by various means. On the 
one hand, it gave a powerful boost to expendi-
ture on internationally tradeable goods. Further-
more, the retardation of the exchange rate not 
only helped to accentuate the deficit in the trade 
account of the balance of payments, but also 
pushed up the domestic interest rate in the local 
currency, by virtue of the expectation of devalua-
tion, as it stimulated the demand for domestic 
credit intermediated by financial institutions. 
Lastly, and this was certainly of great importance 
in several countries of the region, the overvalua-
tion of the currency and the external financial 
openness, in the absence of compensating 
macroeconomic policies or adequate control and 
supervision of external borrowing, tended to 
reinforce themselves and cause an increase in the 
relative prices of goods and assets which were 
not internationally tradeable. In several coun-
tries the inflation of assets prices (the price 
bubble) to levels which subsequently proved not 
to be those of equilibrium, generated an appar-
ent increase in wealth which encouraged expen-
diture and the demand for financing even 
further and at the same time contributed to the 
overvaluation of the real worth of bank guaran-
6This management of the exchange rate was made possible 
and in most cases stimulated by the ample supply of foreign 
exchange resulting from the dramatic increase in the international 
liquidity flowing into the region and from the proliferation of 
policies of financial and trade openness in Latin America during 
this period. Furthermore, the increase in foreign currency reserves 
resulting from the greater net inflow of capital, and in some cases 
from stricter control of the public sector deficit, strengthened the 
arguments in favour of this exchange policy. 
tees and, therefore, to the increased supply of 
bank credit. Figure 1 shows the evolution of real 
share prices in Argentina, Colombia and Chile. 
In some countries of the region tax policies 
caused the financing of enterprises and the for-
mation of capital to come to depend much more 
on the financial sector and external capital than 
on share issues and direct participation in enter-
prises. The tax incentive to increase domestic 
borrowing at the expense of capitalization arose 
when interest payments came to be classed as 
costs deductible from the taxable income of 
enterprises. This exemption was not extended to 
other forms of investment financing (or housing 
purchases) such as share issues, inputs of own 
capital, etc. 
Lastly, the domestic over-indebtedness in 
some countries of the region was also encour-
Figure 1 
REAL SHARE PRICES 







1975 1976 1977 1978 L979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Source: Argentins: Joseph Runos, Neocontervathie Economics in the Southern Cone 
of Latin America, 1973-1983, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1986; Colombia: MF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986; 
Chile: Roberto ZOAtt, Las tasas de Interii en Chile, 197S-198I. in£7 
desarrollo financiero de América Latina y el Caribe, Instituto Interamericana 
de Mercados de Capital. Caracas, 198 S. 
"For Argentina the 1977 value i) the price in the second half-year, after the 
financial liberalisation had begun. 
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aged by the extensive interests of economic con-
glomerates in the ownership of the banks. The 
activities of these groups, such as the creation of 
"paper businesses" or the use of financial practi-
ces at odds with the techniques of risk evaluation 
and concentration of credit, were decisive in 
increasing arrears of payment and the value of 
the exposed portfolio, the related portfolio7 and 
The growth of domestic borrowing and the per-
sistence of the factors which stimulated it had a 
number of effects on the economy in general, 
and on the financial sector in particular, which 
have been of great importance in the crisis 
affecting several countries of the region since the 
early 1980s. 
Theorists and those responsible for carrying 
out the financial reforms believed basically that 
both the "financial expansion", which ultimately 
consisted of an increase in the liabilities of 
domestic origin in the financial system, and the 
contribution of external saving to the formation 
of capital would promote greater volume of sav-
ing and a better allocation of loan funds. 
In practice, the results in most of the coun-
tries of the region were very different from what 
had been expected. This was due to the very 
rapid introduction and inadequate regulation of 
the financial reforms, to the volume and rapidity 
of the net influx of foreign capital, and to the 
simultaneous implementation of other policies 
and reforms whose end result was to promote 
consumption and capital flight rather than sav-
ing, speculation rather than production, and 
imports rather than exports. Although financial 
expansion became widespread in the region 
there was also an increase in domestic borrow-
ing, which is nothing more than the other side of 
the coin viewed from the standpoint of the assets 
(domestic credit) of the financial system. In the 
long run the magnitude, short-term concentra-
tion and excessive risk of the domestic over-
borrowing distorted and impeded economic 
growth and the efficient allocation of resources 
the matured portfolio of the banking system, 
thereby jeopardizing the solvency of the finan-
cial intermediaries and even, on occasion, caus-
ing their failure or State intervention or both. 
'The related portfolio is the portfolio made up of loans 
granted by the banking system to enterprises whose owners have 
an interest in the ownership or management of the lending banks. 
and very seriously undermined the stability and 
solvency of the domestic financial systems. 
The effects of the financiai reforms, the lack 
of coherence of the macroeconomic policies, the 
excessive influx of external credit, the lack of 
adequate control of the financial sector and the 
domestic over-borrowing itself tended to feed on 
each other and spread to other areas of the econ-
omy. With the exceptions of Brazil and Ecuador, 
the financial expansion was reflected in an 
increase in the financial system's liabilities 
(table 4) but not in concomitant increases in 
saving, which also fell in some countries as 
financial saving grew. Other policies boosted 
total consumption. 
The financial deregulation encouraged a 
greater variety of financial instruments designed 
to attract funds from different income groups 
and offering various incentives to save. How-
ever, the expectations generated by the external 
financial openness with respect to a rapid and 
large fall in the domestic interest rate to interna-
tional levels, in conjunction with the high and 
erratic inflation rates and the uncertainty about 
the stability and duration of the financial 
reforms, meant that both saving and lending 
were very short term. 
The increasing financial intermediation, the 
rise of which was explosive in some cases, led to 
a sharp increase in the debt-capital ratio in the 
majority of the countries, in both financial and 
non-financial enterprises. These latter enter-
prises became more vulnerable to interest rate 
increases and to declines in economic activity 
and other changes unfavourable to business 
III 
Growth and effects of domestic over-indebtedness 
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profitability, and the financial enterprises were 
more vulnerable to payment difficulties and the 
larger amounts of arrears accumulated by the 
non-financial enterprises, as well as to unex-
pected withdrawals of domestic deposits and 
external loans. Owing to the importance of 
external loans, exchange rate fluctuations had a 
strong impact on businesses borrowing in dol-
lars and in many cases on the financial system 
itself. 
When real interest rates rose, businesses 
which had had access to bank credit before dereg-
ulation found their financial burden increased. 
Those agents which had been kept out of the 
formal financial market, and especially the con-
sumers, were relatively advantaged by the new 
interest rates because, although they rose very 
high, they were generally lower than the rates 
prevailing in the informal credit markets. 
Where savings were concerned, as stated above, 
the sharp increase in financial saving was not 
reflected in total saving as measured in the 
national accounts. 
From another angle it must be stressed that, 
as the cases of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
show, despite the influx of external credit, the 
dollar levels of domestic interest rates were 
much higher than the corresponding interna-
tional rates (table 5). The causes of these high 
levels included risk components and national 
situations; government demand for loan funds; 
the sharp increase in the demand for domestic 
credit stimulated by inflation of assets prices and 
in some cases by the artificial demand from eco-
nomic groups with an interest in the ownership 
of the banks; the excess demand for financing 
which existed before the financial reforms; and 
the high costs of intermediation. 
To the factors described above must be added 
the effect of exchange rate policy and the exter-
nal financial openness on the expectations of 
devaluation and thus on the real interest rates in 
most of the countries of the region during the 
second half of the 1970s. As stated above, the 
greater availability of foreign exchange through 
the capital account of the balance of payments 
affected the exchange market and contributed to 
the overvaluation of national currencies, which 
was fed back in the anti-ínflationary use of 
exchange rate policy in most of the countries. 
Accordingly, although for some time the global 
balance of payments presented no problems, and 
Table 4 
FINANCIAL EXPANSION, 1975-1985 































































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1986, and several monthly issues up to 
June 1987. 
"Quasi-money and M2 as at the end of the first half of each year, as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
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Table 5 
BORROWING RATES IN DOLLARS, 
1975-1983" 
(Annual percentages) 










































Source: Argentina and Uruguay: Joseph Ramos, 
Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone 
of Latin America, 1973-198$, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Chile: Roberto Zahler, "Las tasas de interés en 
Chile, 1975-1982", in El desarrollo financiero de 
América Latina y el Caribe, Insti tuto 
Interamericano de Mercados de Capital, Caracas, 
1985. 
LIBOR: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
Yearbook 1986. 
"The nominal rates adjusted for exchange rate variations. 
''The average annual interest on six-month dollar deposits. 
cThe second half rate extrapolated for the year, after the 
financial liberalization had begun. 
even registered increases in foreign exchange 
reserves, the sustained and at times growing 
deficit in the current account of the balance of 
payments fuelled expectations of devaluation, 
which in turn produced higher domestic interest 
rates. 
The effects of the high interest rates on 
domestic borrowers were very considerable. 
With real lending rates which exceeded five, ten 
and even more times the rate of economic 
growth, domestic borrowers had serious diffi-
culty in paying the interest, especially as these 
rates were also applied to the total previous debt. 
The explicit or implicit reason why domestic 
borrowing continued at such rates lay in the 
excessively optimistic view of future income and 
expectations of rapid and large falls in the inter-
est rate. When these hopes were disappointed, 
the borrowers, who were already over-
committed, continued to seek loans to try to 
defer indefinitely the liquidation of the assets 
with which they had backed their debt, but 
whose value was now insufficient. For this rea-
son alone, borrowers had nothing to lose. This 
stimulated greater borrowing in the hope of 
improvement in the conditions described above, 
and this increased the upward pressure on inter-
est rates. 
The very essence of the boom which fol-
lowed the oil price increase in the 1970s, a boom 
financed by foreign debt and domestic over-
indebtedness, was its inherent transitoriness. 
For the reasons given above, the change in rela-
tive prices stimulated production, mainly in the 
sector of goods which were not internationally 
tradeable, such as construction and services. Par-
ticularly affected were services connected with 
the import trade (very dependent on the increas-
ing foreign debt financed by the great influx of 
international capital) and financial services 
(owing to the enormous margin between lend-
ing and borrowing rates); this was also reflected 
in the greater participation of the financial sec-
tor in the gross domestic product. The excessive 
expenditure, which overstimulated the produc-
tion of goods which were not tradeable interna-
tionally and the purchase of consumer goods and 
imports, was destined to disappear with the ces-
sation of the influx of capital and deposits which 
fuelled it. The international situation changed 
towards the end of the 1970s: the terms of trade 
worsened, the dollar climbed, interest rates rose 
in the international markets, and recession set ¡n 
in the United States and Europe. The boom came 
to a sudden stop, and the onset of recession was 
accompanied by a sharp increase in real interna-
tional interest rates, which was transmitted to 
the domestic economy and helped to make the 
burden of debt incurred in the boom years 
unsupportable. 
The recession at the beginning of the 1980s 
brought with it a sustained increase in arrears 
and a large number of bankruptcies, which hurt 
the assets portfolio of the financial system. This 
had particularly adverse effects on those econo-
mies in which the financial sector and the overall 
debt-capital ratio had expanded sharply. In these 
cases the effect of the recession on the capacity of 
domestic borrowers to pay was even greater, and 
they had serious difficulties in servicing their 
debt; the capacity of the financial system to cope 
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with the reduced recovery of its loans was also 
affected. Both the official backing of the foreign 
debt and the State guarantees of deposits, de 
facto or de jure, made the banks less vigilant 
about the quality and the risk element of their 
assets portfolio, and at the same time encour-
aged them to increase the lending rates effec-
tively paid by the more efficient or more 
responsible borrowers (aggravating their 
already difficult situation) and their borrowing 
rates, in order to attract more deposits and thus 
cope with their liquidity problems. 
The general economic decline, in conjunc-
tion with the reduced influx of foreign capital 
and the need to devalue local currencies, burst 
the bubble of inflated prices of assets in goods 
which were not internationally tradeable. The 
upward trend of these prices, extremely specula-
tive in many cases and unsustainable in the 
medium term, was partly responsible for the 
expansion of the supply of bank credit and of 
domestic borrowing by some sectors, despite the 
high interest rates. When this bubble burst, the 
value of the real guarantees of the financial sys-
tem's debtors fell, aggravating the system's 
situation even further. Domestically, the capac-
ity of the financial systems to increase their 
The magnitude and universality of the domestic 
debt problem and the fragility of domestic finan-
cial systems forced governments to seek solu-
tions which usually took the form of official 
assistance for debtors and financial intermediar-
ies and indirectly for domestic and foreign dep-
ositors and creditors. This situation arose 
because the economic authorities did not foresee 
the seriousness of the approaching problem or 
its effects on bank liquidity and solvency and the 
interest rate, nor did they allow the failures of 
financial institutions seriously to affect deposi-
tors or foreign creditors. 
The different methods of solving the domes-
tic debt problem have equally different effects on 
deposits in a situation of already high interest 
rates was made even more difficult owing to the 
increasing vulnerability of domestic borrowers 
and of the financial intermediaries themselves. 
Expectations of devaluation, which were fairly 
widespread in the early 1980s, meant that inter-
est rates in local currencies were increasing in 
real terms, exacerbating the problem of domes-
tic debt; on the other hand, the effective depreci-
ation of local currencies, which affected the 
whole region, increased the problems of foreign-
currency borrowers. 
The magnitude, far-reaching effects and 
duration of the crisis of the 1980s exacerbated 
the situation of domestic borrowers, with the 
result that the search for a solution to the prob-
lem of domestic debt was constantly postponed. 
In its turn, the fall in the real value of assets hit 
the financial system especially hard. In order to 
prevent this situation from worsening, several 
financial institutions had to be merged, liqui-
dated or subjected to intervention by the authori-
ties. The resulting economic cost has affected the 
recovery capacity of the region's economies and 
has generally had a marked regressive impact on 
distribution. 
incentives and the allocation of resources and on 
wealth distribution, for the crux of the domestic 
debt problem lies in the transfer of ownership 
among different economic agents. 
An outline of a bank's balance sheet will help 
to explain the nature of the problem. A common 
feature of the banks is that they work with a high 
leverage, i.e., they can invest much more than 
their paid-up capital (10 to 20 times more in 
most of the countries of Latin America). In order 
to do this, the banks have to obtain deposits and 
loans for an amount equivalent to the difference 
between their loans and investments and their 
capital. Accordingly, the paid-up capital of the 
banks is a small percentage of their loan portfo-
IV 
Some choices in the quest for solution of the 
domestic debt problem 
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lio and their third-party debt. Another feature of 
the banks is that the value of their assets portfo-
lio fluctuates in step with the conditions facing 
their borrowers, but this is not true of the value 
of their liabilities portfolio. The knowledge that 
(here will be a State guarantee for deposits and 
official backing for the foreign debt means that 
in practice the value of bank liabilities tends to be 
fairly inflexible on the down side; this sets a rigid 
lower limit which can cause serious distortions if 
the economic value of bank assets falls below 
that of their liabilities. 
There are several factors which can render a 
domestic debt problem more serious. A reces-
sion, inefficient allocation of credit, excessive 
concentration of bank loans, bursting of an 
assets price "bubble" (with a consequent fall in 
the real value of guarantees), the impact of a 
devaluation on foreign-currency debtors in the 
banking system, a decline in the terms of trade, 
or any other factor which has an adverse effect 
on the current value of income from bank loans 
produces a discrepancy between the (lower) eco-
nomic value of bank assets and the (rigid) value 
of their liabilities. In terms of reserves, this 
situation amounts to a loss of bank capital. 
Owing to the high value of these institutions' 
own loans-capital ratio, when a percentage 
(even a fairly small one) of total loans is consi-
dered irrecoverable, a procedure must be devised 
to distribute the loss among the bank's owners 
(who put up its capital), foreign depositors and 
creditors, the banks' debtors and eventually 
other economic agents. 
The universality of the domestic debt prob-
lem, together with its duration and magnitude, 
meant that in the majority of cases the own 
capital and reserves of the banks were insuffi-
cient to cover the loss of capital. Deposit insu-
rance or a political decision not to permit 
significant losses to depositors, the official back-
ing of the foreign debt and the power of the 
foreign creditors, together with other character-
istic features of the banking system, meant that 
depositors and creditors neglected to control the 
banks' administration and to evaluate their oper-
ational results. The State was compelled to inter-
vene to capitalize the banks and/or distribute 
the capital loss and make the necessary transfers 
of assets. 
Different mechanisms have been used in 
different countries. In a few countries part of the 
loss was borne by the foreign creditors. In others 
such as Argentina, the domestic borrowers were 
the beneficiaries, mainly at the expense of the 
depositors, in the process called "liquidation of 
debts", when the real value of bank deposits was 
cut sharply by means of interest rate controls and 
accelerated inflation. 
In Chile the official intervention in most of 
the private banks did not greatly affect either 
depositors or foreign creditors. The capital loss 
was borne by the State by means of official con-
tributions to liquidated banks and the purchase 
by the Central Bank of part of the matured port-
folio of the banking system, with a commitment 
by the banks to use their future profits to buy 
back this portfolio. There was also direct aid for 
foreign-currency debtors (as there was in Vene-
zuela) by means of a subsidy for the "dollar 
debtor", the price of which remained far below 
the market value of that currency. More recently, 
the reprivatization of banks has gone ahead in 
Chile with financing from the private sector and 
with the stimulus of generous tax incentives. 
In Uruguay several banks had to be sold as a 
result of the decline in the real value of the 
financial system's assets. In order to facilitate the 
sale, the Central Bank intervened, as it did in 
Chile, by taking over part of the bad debts of 
these institutions.8 
The other countries of the region had tackled 
the problem of their domestic debt with a combi-
nation of the methods described above, with 
Peru as perhaps the main exception. In this 
country the distribution of the burden of the 
domestic debt affected foreign creditors; for 
their part, the debtor enterprises managed to 
transfer to the rest of society most of the impact 
of the recession by means of cuts in real salaries 
and lower tax payments, while negative real 
interest rates improved their net worth. For 
these reasons, the financial system was not so 
seriously affected in Peru as in most of the other 
countries of the region by a widespread deterio-
ration in its loans portfolio. 
8In another type of operation the Central Bank of Uruguay 
also bought doubtful debts from private banks, which undertook to 
put in new foreign financing. This was a fruitless attempt to 
maintain its exchange rate policy at a time when access to interna-
tional loans had declined sharply. 
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These methods of "solving" the domestic 
debt problem in the region have usually been 
supplemented by measures to make it easier for 
debtors to pay by means of the rescheduling of 
payment periods and some reductions in finan-
cial costs. Behind this policy stands the assump-
tion that the conditions which created the 
problems of domestic borrowers would soon 
change; therefore, in order to gain time, the 
relief provided by the rescheduling or refinanc-
ing secured in the foreign debt negotiations 
which the countries of the region have engaged 
in since the end of 1982 is transferred to the 
domestic debtors. Perhaps the main negative 
aspect of this type of measure is that it offers no 
incentives to domestic debtors to meet their 
financial commitments; they continue to expect 
to obtain similar facilities in the future, some-
thing which is increasingly less likely if the 
arrears are not reduced and the problem remains 
widespread. 
Viewing the situation from another stand-
point, a distinction must be made between deb-
tor enterprises which are economically 
inefficient and those which are financially non-
viable. The enterprises in the first group 
—which produce losses even in the best possible 
operating conditions— have no valid reason, 
either economic or financial, to remain in exist-
ence, for their market value is nil (or negative). 
The enterprises which are economically efficient 
but not financially viable owing to the excessive 
debt burden are different. These enterprises per-
form a useful social function, for they generate 
an economic benefit even when their share-
holders are suffering financial losses. The eco-
nomic value of such enterprises at social prices is 
usually positive; in normal conditions their 
situation is resolved by an equity loss on the part 
of their shareholders, which ought not greatly to 
affect their economic efficiency since, in princi-
ple, the generation of the product is not neces-
sarily impaired by the price at which ownership 
rights are transferred. 
This reasoning seems to suggest that in real-
ity there is no "problem" of domestic debt, for 
economic mechanisms exist to prevent the 
excessive debt from affecting the overall effi-
ciency of the economic system. However, when 
the domestic debt is very large, when it is wides-
pread and of long duration and jeopardizes the 
financial system's stability and solvency (all con-
ditions pertaining in Latin America in recent 
years to one extent or another), what is in theory 
a simple transfer of wealth, usually involves in 
practice considerable net economic costs for 
society. 
These costs arise in part because under the 
conditions just described the transfers of wealth 
and ownership among debtor enterprises does 
not correct the asymmetry between the value of 
the assets and liabilities of the financial system. 
This occurs because the fall in the value of the 
guarantees of the doubtful loans is such that they 
cannot recover their original value and because 
the depositors and creditors of the financial sys-
tem do not bear their full share of the capital loss 
involved. Moreover, the widespread nature of 
the problem has impeded and delayed the legal 
process of liquidating enterprises, and this pro-
cess indeed is not cost-free and can help to erode 
even further the value of the real guarantees and 
thus the overall quality of the banks' portfolio. 
Accordingly, the solutions to the problem of 
domestic over-indebtedness have large eco-
nomic costs. These costs include the fiscal 
burden resulting from the direct contributions 
by the Treasury or the Central Bank to capitalize 
the financial system. There are other indirect 
costs connected with the purchase of matured 
portfolios, subsidy of interest rates and the for-
eign exchange price (this to ease the situation of 
foreign currency debtors) and, in more general 
terms, with resources furnished to different 
pressure groups which are trying to solve their 
own domestic debt problems. The over-
indebtedness also generates very tangible costs, 
owing both to the effect of the uncertainty about 
ownership rights on private investment and to 
the restrictions imposed on lending by the finan-
cial system to those activities which could rec-
over more easily or which offer clear advantages 
for the resumption of recovery and growth. 
All this leads to the conclusion that the 
region's excessive domestic debt has become a 
serious problem which is impeding the reactiva-
tion and expansion of the productive capacity, 
owing both to its effect on enterprises in the real 
sector of the economy and to its effect on finan-
cial institutions. As a result of institutional and 
legal rigidity and the downside inflexibility of 
the nominal value of bank liabilities, ownership 
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must be transferred and capital losses recog-
nized; the effects of these processes are not neu-
tral from the perspective of either efficiency or 
equity. 
Experience suggests that in order to minim-
ize the economic costs, preference must be given 
to rapid solutions which, in view of the discre-
pancy between the size of the problem and the 
available resources, should be of a selective kind. 
The legal and institutional problems which are 
delaying the normalization of economic activity 
must be solved, so that the financial sector can 
provide new résources for activities which are 
economically efficient in terms of the viability of 
the debtor enterprises and of the contribution 
which they can be expected to make to recovery 
and economic growth. In this same spirit, the 
solution to the domestic debt problem should 
give priority to the meeting of commitments and 
encourage the reduction of the arrears, while at 
the same time discouraging expectations of 
future financial pardons. 
Where distribution is concerned, any solu-
tion which does not envisage the appropriate 
The region's recent experience with respect to 
domestic over-indebtedness has taught several 
lessons of definite usefulness in the formulation 
of macroeconomic and financial policies. 
Firstly, there seems to be a close link 
between domestic over-indebtedness and certain 
modalities of financial deregulation. Abrupt 
financial reforms without adequate supervision 
may indeed help to secure a considerable 
increase in financial savings (financial expan-
sion), but they can also cause an explosion of 
domestic debt (debt expansion) in relation to 
other forms and sources of financing of eco-
nomic activities. This situation in turn makes the 
economic system more vulnerable to changes in 
transfer of ownership among the agents directly 
involved (debtors, owners, depositors and credi-
tors of the banks) must be viewed, essentially, as 
containing a large element of discretionality or 
arbitrariness. And the same can happen with 
certain specific forms of transfer of ownership. 
At the same time, the direction which official 
intervention gives to the "solution" of the prob-
lem certainly involves apolitical aspect. No deci-
sion, ranging from nationalization of the 
banking system to its reprivatization, which 
envisages measures which affect to different 
degrees and in different ways domestic and for-
eign depositors and creditors, and taxpayers in 
general, wage earners, investors, or any other 
group or sector on which all or part of the cost of 
financing the capital loss may fall, can be des-
cribed as based on strictly economic considera-
tions. However, because these decisions have 
different effects on incentives to save and invest, 
the flight of capital, the reduction of arrears, etc., 
they warrant specific study which takes into 
account the special features of each situation, so 
that the relative merits of the available chokes 
can be evaluated in their totality. 
interest rates, the terms of trade, the net influx 
of (internal and external) deposits and loans, 
and economic activity. This is particularly true 
when interest rates are floating, for their varia-
tion will affect both new loans and the total 
existing debt. In this case, interest rate changes 
will have significant repercussions, for they will 
directly affect the net worth and economic viabil-
ity of existing enterprises. 
Secondly, although the decontrol of interest 
rates can balance the market in loan funds, it can 
cause the interest rate to rise to very excessive 
levels with respect to variables with which it 
ought to maintain some connection (such as, for 
example, the productivity of capital and the eco-
V 
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nomic growth rate), and this tends to cause sig-
nificant imbalances in other markets. Extremely 
high interest rates weaken the situation of the 
debtors and increase the exposure of the assets 
portfolio of financial intermediaries; they also 
distort the foreign exchange market by artifi-
cially stimulating the influx of capital, they cause 
the exchange rate to be overvalued, they 
threaten the dynamism of the sector of interna-
tionally tradeable goods, and they have an 
adverse effect on the current account of the bal-
ance of payments. In the long term this last 
effect tends to undermine the supply of foreign 
financing and contributes in practice to devalua-
tion of the exchange rate; this affects foreign 
currency debtors and, through them, the whole 
of the financial system. Therefore, if certain pri-
ces, no matter how free they may be, fall out of 
line with what would be reasonably normal 
values, this fact must be given particular weight 
in order to anticipate problems in the operation 
of the market concerned or serious imbalances in 
other markets. 
Thirdly, a massive influx of external financ-
ing is not sufficient to bring domestic interest 
rates down and hold them down. The increased 
risk associated with national situations and the 
greater expectations of devaluation resulting 
from the increasing foreign debt and exchange 
rate overvaluation both have the effect of accen-
tuating the disparity between the domestic and 
international interest rates. Segmentation of 
markets, unequal access to external credit, 
uneven degrees of substitution among various 
domestic and international assets, and overva-
luation of assets which are not tradeable interna-
tionally are more likely to cause assets to be 
overvalued than to reduce interest rates. The 
wealth generated in this way tends to encourage 
consumption rather than saving, although at the 
same time there may be an increase in the hold-
ing of financial assets. The lack of correspon-
dence between the massive influx of external 
capital and domestic investment, together with 
the impact of financial openness on the 
exchange rate, which is quite the opposite of 
what is expected from trade openness, under-
mine the potential advantages of economic 
openness and impair the efficient allocation of 
resources by economic agents who borrow in 
foreign currency, and, worst of all, they erode the 
quality of the assets portfolio of the financial 
system. 
Fourthly, financial reforms in economies lit-
tle accustomed to operating competitively in this 
sector are not sufficient in themselves to ensure 
better allocation of financial resources. The tra-
ditional criteria for portfolio management and 
risk evaluation on the part of financial interme-
diaries, in conjunction with the legal or defacto 
availability of deposit insurance and official 
backing of the foreign debt, fuel the upward 
movement of interest rates and encourage 
unprofessional and excessively risky manage-
ment (both of the loans portfolio and of mea-
sures to increase deposits) on the part of 
domestic financial systems. In particular, very 
harmful effects have resulted from the combina-
tion of a free interest rate and State guarantees of 
the financial system's assets, outmoded banking 
legislation and inadequate supervision and regu-
lation of the composition and quality of the loans 
portfolio, and the competition in attracting dep-
osits by means of interest rate manipulation. 
This combination encourages excessive growth 
of the financial sector and imprudent and exces-
sively risky bank lending policies, and it fuels the 
domestic over-indebtedness; it also creates con-
ditions for an unstable interest rate and makes a 
large part of the financial system very vulnerable 
if not directly insolvent. 
Fifthly, the tax structure and legislation can 
stimulate domestic borrowing which is excessive 
and undesirable with respect to other capitaliza-
tion mechanisms. The tendency to tax dividends 
and distributed profits and to make interest pay-
ments deductible from taxable income creates a 
clear distortion, and taxation policies must cer-
tainly be reexamined in this respect. Sixthly, 
certain key macroeconomic prices, such as the 
exchange rate, the interest rate and wages, ought 
to be managed in a more flexible and co-
ordinated manner. In particular, an attempt 
should be made to spread the impact of sharp 
and unexpected changes in the economy among 
different markets, so as to minimize any price 
disalignments and influence the movement of 
those economic variables which are fundamental 
to proper resource allocation. This means that 
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no price should be excessively rigid, for this 
rigidity will isolate the market from the impact 
of external events and concentrate it in the rest 
of the economy. 
Lastly, an attempt must be made to discon-
nect the ownership of the big enterprises in the 
real sector of the economy from the ownership 
of the financial system, with a view to reducing 
the concentration of this system's loans portfolio 
and thus its exposure as well, and in order to 
discourage speculative and potentially destabil-
izing management of the financial sector. 
